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Abstract: 
The United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union has long been fraught, creating 
tensions with European partners and dividing the main political parties.  To try to overcome 
internal divisions in the Labour Party, Harold Wilson sought to renegotiate the UK’s terms of 
membership and then held a referendum on whether the country should stay in. The result – a 
two to one majority of remaining - was thought to have ended the question marks over British 
membership definitively. Four decades later, it was the Conservatives who were divided over 
Europe and Prime Minister David Cameron, in what appeared to be almost a carbon copy of 
Wilson’s actions, promising reform, renegotiation and a referendum. Yet the stakes in 2016 
were rather higher than in 1975 and the challenges far greater - the more multi-faceted and 
institutionalised nature of the EU rendered the debate, and the potential costs and benefits, 
more complex. This article assesses the similarities between the two prime ministers’ 
decisions to renegotiate the UK’s terms of membership and the frameworks established for 
the ensuing referendums and notes  significant differences, which render over-interpreting the 
parallels a risky business.   
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‘And as the Cabinet agreed on Saturday, the government’s position will be to recommend 
that Britain remains in this reformed European Union’ (Cameron 2016b, col. 24). Thus, 
David Cameron told the House of Commons that, after nine months of renegotiation with 
European Union (EU) partners, he now advocated that the UK should vote to remain in the 
EU in a referendum to be held on 23
rd
 June 2016. It all seemed eerily familiar: a Prime 
Minister leading a divided party with just a small parliamentary majority renegotiating the 
UK’s membership of ‘Europe’ before calling a referendum on whether to stay in and waiving 
cabinet responsibility on the matter in order to secure the future of his own party, just has 
Labour PM Harold Wilson had done in 1975. The expectation had been that, like Wilson, 
Cameron would come back with precious little to show for his pains but nonetheless would 
argue he had secured enough to recommend that the UK should now remain in the EU, 
creating a carbon copy of the 1975 experience, albeit with the Conservatives rather than 
Labour now suffering the deepest divisions over Europe.  
 
Yet the reality is rather more nuanced. The 1975 referendum created two precedents and 
provided one constitutional anomaly: it was the first national referendum to be held in the 
United Kingdom and provided British voters with their first opportunity to say whether or not 
they wished to be part of the European Community (or ‘Common Market’ as it was generally 
known) as well as being only the second time that collective cabinet responsibility had been 
waived.
2
 Inevitably a second referendum on remaining in the EU would not be ground-
breaking in the same way. The fact that it should happen at all is evidence that the decision 
taken in 1975 was not the end of the story as pro-Europeans assumed at the time.
3
 There are, 
however, significant parallels in the motives and choices of Labour’s Harold Wilson and the 
Conservative David Cameron as they sought to hold their fractured parties together. The aim 
of this article is to analyse continuities and changes in the UK’s relations with the EC/U as 
seen in the two episodes. Taking as its starting point the present author’s 1999 evaluation of 
the 1975 referendum (Smith 1999), it seeks to highlight points of comparison between the 
approaches of Wilson and Cameron. It is based in part on extensive analysis of primary 
materials, including Hansard, political speeches, party manifestos and European Council 
conclusions, as well as insights from the author’s personal experiences leading for the Liberal 
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Democrat benches in the House of Lords on the EU Referendum Bill, which became the EU 
Referendum Act 2015 and paved the way for the 2016 referendum. It draws additionally on 
information arising from interviews with key players and numerous off-the-record meetings 
with UK and other EU politicians in the three years since David Cameron’s landmark 
Bloomberg Speech in which he pledged to reform the EU, renegotiate the UK’s terms of 
membership and hold an in/out referendum should the Conservatives win the 2015 general 
election.  
 
The article argues that the decisions to renegotiate the UK’s terms of membership and hold a 
popular vote on remaining in the European club reflected the two leaders’ inability to hold 
their respective parties together on an issue of relatively low public salience but one that 
caused visceral intra-party disagreements. In both cases the leaders were willing to eschew 
constitutional conventions by turning to direct democracy to overcome an issue dividing their 
parties. Yet, as the article shows, while there are marked and indeed intentional similarities in 
the two cases, there were also notable differences. The stakes were far higher in 2016 than in 
1975 when the EC was less influential in terms of scope and impact, and less 
institutionalised. As a very new member the UK was far from embedded in the Community 
economically or institutionally when citizens first voted on whether to stay in. A ‘No’ vote in 
1975 would essentially have resulted in a return to a known alternative, the status quo ante 
1973, in a world by then little changed since before the UK joined the EC; leaving in the 
second decade of the 21
st
 Century would be quite different. The EU had changed beyond 
recognition and so too had the international context in which the UK and EU function; the 
UK’s other spheres of interest, the Commonwealth and the US had evolved in very different 
directions and a vote to leave the EU of 2016 would be a step into the unknown.   
 
The article looks first at the contested nature of membership of the EC/U in British politics.  
It then addresses the introduction of referendums into UK constitutional politics before 
looking at the two sets of renegotiation and the frameworks established for the ensuing 
referenda. It does not seek to evaluate the campaigns nor speculate on the longer-term impact 
of the second referendum, which will be the subject of many subsequent articles, chapters and 
books. This piece seeks, rather to look at how and why David Cameron reached the point of 
calling a referendum in February 2016 and on what basis. 
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The European question in British politics before 1975 
Unlike other Member States, the UK’s attitude towards the European project has consistently 
been ambivalent. The founding members – France, Germany, Italy and the three Benelux 
countries – came together for a variety of economic and security reasons in the wake of two 
world wars. Their rationale was clear: to secure peace and prosperity. Other states that came 
late to the European club similarly aspired to the ambition of a secure and peaceful Europe, 
and/or to the economic benefits that appeared to be associated with it. The United Kingdom’s 
position was more complicated from the outset. Having declined to join ‘the Six’ in founding 
the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and the Economic and Atomic Energy 
Communities in 1957, the UK rapidly sought an alternative grouping, initially in the form of 
a wider free trade area and subsequently in the form of the competitor European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) of which it was the founder and leading member (Camps 1993). These 
moves, which well reflected a long-standing (and ongoing) British preference for a trading 
bloc rather than any political alliance was greeted with hostility by French President Charles 
de Gaulle, who would subsequently block two British attempts to join the EC, first under 
Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in 1961 and then by Harold Wilson in 1967.  
Neither PM was dogmatically in favour of joining but each recognised the benefits that 
appeared to be accruing to the Six. In the case of Wilson, the deterioration of the UK 
economy ensured that the 1967 application was born out of weakness.   
 
With de Gaulle’s departure from the French and European stages in 1969, the UK’s 
application was re-opened under Wilson’s premiership, although the final deal on accession 
was concluded by his Conservative successor, the committed pro-European Edward Heath.  
Membership remained a contested issue, however, and the Labour Party’s lukewarm support 
for membership while in office turned to opposition when they lost power. Thus, although the 
terms of accession agreed by Heath differed little from those that Labour had been discussing 
with the Six (Thompson 1999), Labour imposed a three-line whip to oppose accession in 
1971. Nonetheless, the vote was carried thanks to 69 rebel Labour MPs voting with the 
Government and 20 abstaining.
4
 Britain finally joined the Communities on 1
st
 January 1973, 
two decades after the founding states had come together and only after a French plebiscite on 
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whether Britain should be allowed to join (Leigh, 1975). British voters were not afforded the 
same chance to vote on their own future as Heath upheld the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty. Thus, the UK became one of the few late-comers to the EC/U to join without a 
popular vote.  
 
Referendums in UK politics  
The UK has traditionally asserted parliamentary sovereignty as the essential way of taking 
decisions, eschewing the idea of direct democracy. Indeed,‘…until the 1970s, the referendum 
was widely regarded as unconstitutional’ (Bogdanor 2005: 78). Thus, while there were 
divisions in the Conservative Party on the European question, they were not sufficient to 
cause Heath to deviate from the parliamentary model. Speaking in 1971, he argued that ‘No 
British government could take the UK into the EC without the wish of the British people. But 
this should be by parliament.’5 This view was widely held, as it would be two decades later 
when ratification of the Treaty on European Union, the so-called Maastricht Treaty, was on 
the agenda – ministers with views on the substance of the European question as different as 
Europhile Kenneth Clarke and Thatcherite Eurosceptic Michael Portillo opposed a device 
often construed as one for demagogues (see Major, 1999: 275).  Yet, as Bogdanor has argued, 
the decision to hold a referendum when power is to be transferred, as it was on accession and 
at each treaty reform, accords with the Lockean tradition since, ‘the Legislative cannot 
transfer the power of making laws to any other hands: for it being but a delegated power from 
the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others’ (Locke quoted by Bogdanor 1999: 
78). Certainly other latecomers to the EU have used referendums extensively whether to 
accede to the EC/U or to ratify treaty reforms.  
 
Thus, in 1972 Norway, Ireland and Denmark all held referendums on whether to join, with 
three quite different experiences: Norwegian voters opted to reject entry, as they would do 
again in 1995, whereas both the Irish and the Danes decided to accede. The fact that the 
decision was made by plebiscite - not for any high moral reason but because their respective 
constitutions required it – ensured that entry had direct popular legitimacy in Ireland and 
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Denmark in a way that was arguably lacking in the UK. Moreover, whereas the Irish 
establishment and public were all in favour of joining, the Danish case was rather more akin 
to the British and could perhaps have provided a solution to British party political difficulties. 
Like the British Labour Party, the Danish Social Democrats were divided on membership, so 
for the accession referendum the People’s Movement against the Common Market was born 
to fight against membership. It re-formed at subsequent referendums and for elections to the 
European Parliament, thereby allowing Danish parties to remain intact for domestic elections 
while giving voters a chance to vote for anti-integration groups in referendums and European 
Parliament elections.  
 
However, like Heath, the Labour leadership was initially opposed to the idea of a referendum. 
Only after the party left office in 1970 and the Labour left’s hostility to membership of the 
Community hardened did the Labour Party talk the language of renegotiation and referendum 
in its manifestos for the two general elections of 1974.  Having originally rejected the idea of 
a referendum, proposed by Tony Benn, Wilson gradually recognised that the ‘device of right-
wingers’, as he and James Callaghan saw it, despite Benn’s own leftwing credentials, could 
be the salvation of the party.
6
 As former Labour MP Giles, now Lord, Radice (2015) put it: 
 
‘… as the row inside the Labour Party over Europe grew in intensity, Wilson changed 
his mind. He turned to the referendum as a means of uniting a divided party—yes, we 
were divided—and remaining in the EU. As the Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, 
had predicted, it proved to be a useful “rubber dinghy”.’  
 
The Conservatives viewed the move with disdain; it was not ‘a principled decision’, the pro-
European Michael (now Lord) Heseltine would assert some forty years later.
7
  
 
Yet while the idea of deciding on European issues via referendum had repelled the 
Conservatives in the 1970s, it began to gain traction in the 1990s, following the emergence of 
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the Referendum Party led by Sir James Goldsmith and the UK Independence Party (UKIP) 
founded by Professor Alan Sked at the time of Maastricht Treaty ratification. By the mid-
1990s all three main parties, Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat, were committed to 
holding a referendum before any decision to join the Euro; a pledge they repeated with regard 
to the ultimately aborted Constitutional Treaty. When Gordon Brown decided not to hold a 
referendum on the Lisbon Treaty that replaced the Constitutional Treaty, the Conservatives 
continued to call for one, with many expressing frustration that Cameron did not call such a 
poll when he became PM, even though the Treaty had by then been ratified and come into 
effect. The issue of EU membership became a running sore in the first half of the 2010-15 
Coalition Government as Cameron’s attempts to placate his rebellious backbench 
Eurosceptics merely fuelled their desire for more concessions (see Smith 2015; Lynch, 2015). 
Finally, in his now famous Bloomberg Speech of January 2013 he announced that if re-
elected the Conservatives would offer an in/out referendum. The decision to seek to change 
the UK’s terms of engagement before moving to the vote made his approach look almost 
identical to Wilson’s.  
 
Cameron added a third ‘r’ to renegotiation and referendum, namely ‘reform’, which 
politicians from all parties had long agreed was required.
8
 The commitment proved to be a 
shrewd one, at least for two and half years. The 3Rs ‘reform, renegotiation and referendum’ 
coupled with the mantra ‘Labour and the Liberal Democrats won’t give you a say. UKIP 
can’t give you a say. Only the Conservative Party will deliver real change in Europe – and 
only the Conservatives can and will deliver an in/out referendum’ (Conservatives 2015: 72-3) 
provided a clear message to voters in the 2014 European Parliament elections and the 2015 
general election. More importantly for Cameron it meant that the sceptics on his backbenches 
who had beleaguered his premiership until that time would mostly remain silent until after the 
general election, placated by the promise of the longed-for referendum. Cameron had ensured 
that his fractious party held together on this most contentious of issues, at least in the short 
term.
9
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The Renegotiations 
Wilson told his EC opposite numbers before the October election that ‘he rejected any moves 
towards political union’ (Ibid: 192) but when it came to the renegotiation, he did not seek 
treaty change, which then as now requires unanimity among member states. Rather, he sought 
to alter the UK’s terms of membership of the EC, which he argued were disadvantageous 
‘Tory terms’, even though they were essentially the same terms his own government had 
been discussing with the Community before Heath took office in 1970 (Thompson 1999: 2; 
O’Neill 2000: 9). In line with the Labour Party’s manifesto commitments of October 1974, 
Wilson’s demands focused on a set of issues that had plagued British-EC relations since 
before accession (Spreckley 1975: 2-3), many of which would prove equally contentious 
when Cameron launched his renegotiation. The result of the renegotiation, which was led by 
Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, was limited, a rather convoluted ‘correcting mechanism 
to the Community budget’, destined never to be triggered, being the main achievement. Years 
later the former German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, was dismissive of what he termed a 
‘cosmetic operation’ (quoted in Young 1998: 283) and he had clearly been frustrated by 
Wilson’s neglect of ‘long-term interests’ (Haeussler 2015: 774). Yet at the time, Schmidt had 
assisted Wilson, attending the 1974 Labour Party Conference ‘to rally the troops’.10 His 
support was, however, conditional on Wilson being willing to speak out in favour of the UK 
remaining in the EC (Spreckley 1975: 556). 
 
The legacy of Wilson’s renegotiation posed something of a problem for Cameron. Hailed by 
Wilson himself at the time as meaning he could now recommend that Britain should stay in 
the Common Market, the renegotiation was rapidly seen as a sham, and not just by Schmidt. 
Wilson had the advantage of creating a precedent in his renegotiation, few publically sought 
to talk down his achievements at the time and those who favoured leaving perhaps failed to 
notice the smoke and mirrors. That precedent meant that objective commentators and 
Eurosceptic detractors alike  were predisposed to look at Cameron’s attempts at reform and 
renegotiation with a rather jaundiced eye: you cannot play the same game twice and get away 
with it. Certainly few sceptics in 2016 would accept a smoke and mirrors deal done by 
Cameron. As Dominic Cummings, at the time the campaign director of the Vote Leave 
group, put it: ‘This process has not been about trying to get fundamental change of the EU, or 
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fundamental change of Britain’s relationship with the EU, or to solve the big problems of the 
EU. It is about how David Cameron manages his own personal interests and the internal 
politics of the Conservative Party’ (Bagehot 2016). Coupled with 24/7 media coverage, the 
rise of the internet social media and the loss of Chinese walls between media from different 
member states, this ensured Cameron would always have a difficult job replicating Wilson’s 
trick. Alongside challenges from those overtly hostile to EU membership in the form of 
UKIP and those pro-Europeans such as the SNP who were always willing to take a swipe at 
the Tories despite ostensibly being on the same side of the referendum argument, Cameron’s 
renegotiation game was always going to be more difficult to pull off domestically than 
Wilson’s. In practice, he needed to play a high-risk three-level game: firstly, within his own 
party; secondly, with his opposite numbers in the 27 other Member States; last - and possibly 
least in his strategic thinking – with the British electorate. 
 
Cameron asked his own party to reserve judgment on whether to support remaining in or 
leaving the Union until after he had completed the renegotiations, when he would make a 
recommendation. The issue thus became one of confidence in his leadership, quite unlike the 
situation with Wilson, who never invested personal capital in the issue. Sceptics swiftly broke 
ranks. Former Chancellor Nigel Lawson pronounced himself President of Conservatives for 
Britain in October 2015, stating that he had reluctantly concluded that Cameron would be 
unable to secure a sufficiently good deal for him to support remaining in (Guardian 2015).  
  
Moreover, the European context rendered his objectives even harder to achieve. With 
migrant, Eurozone and security crises absorbing most of their energies, European leaders had 
little time to devote to Cameron’s need for reform and renegotiation. And just as forty years 
of sceptic rhetoric had had their effect within the UK, so decades of British awkwardness had 
caused frustration among the UK’s fellow EU member states. While most members were 
clear that they wanted the UK to remain, they were equally clear it could not be at any price. 
The drift to scepticism among their own populations also caused serious concern, not least in 
France where President Hollande was facing electoral challenges from the far-right, 
Eurosceptic Front National of Marine Le Pen. Reform and renegotiation that required any 
unpicking of the treaties would thus inevitably have fallen foul of other European leaders 
10 
 
reluctant to see the European edifice that had been crafted by a series of package deals over 
several decades potentially pulled apart.   
 
As in 1974/5, the British government looked to Germany for support. Yet however personally 
supportive Angela Merkel may have been of Cameron and however committed to keeping the 
UK in the EU, there were limits to her powers. She too had her critics and sceptics at home 
and despite numerous positive remarks along the lines of: ‘Where there’s a will’, she never  
went as far as Cameron understood she had, namely to say that she would do ‘everything’ to 
keep the UK in. Cameron’s tendency to default to bilateral Anglo-German relations to get 
things done during the Coalition government, even then with only limited success (see Smith 
2015) would not suffice to secure the deal he hoped to achieve. He had to convince 27 EU 
colleagues, each of whom would have to agree to the renegotiation package, as well as the 
European Parliament, which would be required to agree consequential secondary legislation 
arising from the renegotiations, of the merits of his case for reform and renegotiation. This 
would be a rather more onerous challenge than Wilson’s, Merkel’s behind-the-scenes help 
notwithstanding. 
 
Thus, after securing re-election in May 2015, Cameron, along with Chancellor of the 
Exchequer George Osborne, Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond and Europe Minister David 
Lidington, promptly began a tour of capitals to discuss the government’s demands. Like 
Wilson before him, Cameron focused extensively on his party’s manifesto commitments, 
which had already highlighted areas of concern to be addressed. Again like his predecessor, 
he was reluctant to put his demands formally on paper, precisely because he did not want to 
show his hand too soon, either to his European colleagues or the Eurosceptics at home. His 
detractors, both British commentators and politicians, especially in his own party, and his EU 
opposite numbers, complained that Cameron’s demands were not clear, despite the fact that 
they had been flagged up in his Bloomberg speech and repeated in the 2015 general election 
manifesto. Inevitably EU colleagues were not impressed by the idea that they should go to 
look at speeches and manifestos, as the UK allegedly told them to do, preferring Cameron to 
make a direct case to them.
11
 He finally did this on 10
th
 November 2015 in a letter to 
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European Council President Donald Tusk and in a lecture at Chatham House. There, he 
harked back to his Bloomberg Speech, outlining his four ‘baskets’ of demands: economic 
governance, sovereignty, competitiveness, and welfare/immigration.  
 
Neither his speech nor his letter to Tusk elaborated much on what informed scholars and 
journalists had already picked up about the renegotiation but they did appear to meet the 
demands of those seeking some clarity on the issue. Reform and renegotiation appeared to go 
hand-in-hand for Cameron, as many of the interwoven strands linked them closely together. 
‘Reform’ was not seen as a one-off occurrence, but, rather, as part of the continuous process 
of European integration, as something that Britain could only affect by remaining a member. 
Cameron, aware that his demands should not simply be seen by EU partners as a unilateral 
wish-list for the UK, also made clear that some, if not all, of these demands would benefit 
other member states too, just as Wilson had done (Haeussler 2015: 775).
12
 Thus on 
sovereignty he was seeking an enhanced role for national parliaments, which parliaments in 
many EU states sought,
13
 alongside subsidiarity to which the EU has been formally 
committed since the 1993 Maastricht Treaty. A request for the UK to be exempted from the 
commitment to ‘ever-closer union’ was potentially more tricky but since the UK had long 
demonstrated its adherence to this concept only in the breach, and given the general drift 
away from the federal vision in Europe, this did not appear too difficult to achieve. The drive 
for competitiveness was in line with long-standing British support for the internal market, and 
wholly in line with the reforms and moves to reduce regulation already being undertaken by 
the Juncker Commission and hence needed little renegotiation.   
 
Potentially more complex was the idea that there should be no discrimination between 
Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries, alongside a recognition that some states would remain 
permanently outside the common currency. This would be an admission by the Union that the 
divide between the Eurozone ins and outs would be permanent, not transitional as had long 
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been expected. However, Cameron stressed that his demands would be to the benefit of all. It 
was a point he reiterated at Davos in January 2016:  
 
‘I want the Eurozone to be a success…I don’t want to stand in the way of things that 
need to be done to make the Eurozone a success…what we need is an organisation 
that is flexible enough so that you can be a success if you’re not in the euro, or a 
success if you are in the euro, and fair rules between the two’ Cameron 2016a).  
 
In the event, Cameron secured what he was asking for in this area. The fourth basket, an 
attempt to reduce numbers of EU nationals coming to the UK to claim welfare benefits was 
the most controversial area for discussion, since it would have direct effects on the nationals 
of other EU member states, especially from Central and Eastern Europe.   
 
While Cameron (2016a) argued that his approach offered ‘a very carefully thought through 
plan, and one that can bring great benefits not just for Britain, but for Europe’, many fellow 
parliamentarians begged to disagree. The list of four baskets was met with some derision in 
the House of Commons when Europe Minister David Lidington was sent to the despatch box 
to make a statement following the PM’s own appearance at Chatham House and the 
publication of his letter to Tusk. Sir William Cash, the long-standing Chairman of the House 
of Commons European Scrutiny Committee called it a ‘pig in a poke’ (House of Commons 
Hansard 10 November 2015, col. 229). For those determined to leave the EU the situation 
was straightforward: ‘It is perfectly clear, no matter which party you represent, that the Prime 
Minister’s renegotiation is of very little consequence. Nothing major nor fundamental is even 
on the table, nor up for debate’ (Farage et al 2016). Yet, for pro-Europeans within the 
Conservative Party it was essential to stress the significance of the potential outcome of the 
negotiations. They were not intended to win over the likes of UKIP leader Nigel Farage or 
Tory Eurosceptics such as Liam Fox and Bernard Jenkin who were wedded to ‘Brexit’; they 
were intended to persuade those in the Conservative Party and the country at large who had 
either not made up their minds on the existential remain/leave question or who were sceptical 
13 
 
but open to persuasion – seemingly a sizeable section of both constituencies, at least when 
Cameron commenced his talks.
14
  
 
Cameron’s EU colleagues stressed the fact that the demands posed some considerable 
difficulties, thereby implying they were rather more substantive in practice than the sceptics 
were willing to acknowledge.
15
 In particular, moves to change the rules on EU nationals 
claiming benefits were met with hostility by some leaders. Nonetheless, Cameron (2016a) 
hoped to secure a deal that he could recommend to his party and then to the country in the 
referendum that would follow just as Wilson had done before him. And so it proved. Late on 
19
th
 February 2016 European Council President Donald Tusk announced there was a deal 
very much along the lines outlined by Tusk two weeks previously, and acceptable to the PM.  
He had secured commitments on non-discrimination for non-Eurozone members, exemption 
from ‘ever closer union’, a red card for national parliaments, improved competitiveness and 
changes to reduce EU nationals’ ability to secure welfare benefits. And the deal would be 
lodged with the UN to be interpreted under international law. The following day the Cabinet 
agreed to recommend that, on the strength of the deal, the UK should remain in the EU. 
Immediately after the Cabinet meeting ended, so too did the temporary truce that had 
pervaded the Conservative Party. After all it was the deep divisions within their own parties 
that prompted both Cameron, and Wilson, to call a referendum in the first place and the 
referendum pledge had merely frozen differences rather than ending them; now the battle 
could begin in earnest. 
 
Setting the terms of referendums 
The innovative nature of the 1975 referendum enabled Wilson essentially to set his own rules 
of engagement for the plebiscite – there was no precedent to follow and few formal rules. The 
legislation for the referendum itself was passed only after the renegotiation had been 
completed in March 1975 (Donoughue 1993: 196). In marked contrast, in order to 
demonstrate there could be no back-sliding on his commitment, David Cameron introduced 
the legislation to permit his promised referendum in June 2015. The ensuing European Union 
Referendum Act 2015 received Royal Assent on 17
th
 December 2015 after lengthy debate in 
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both Houses of Parliament. Much of the debate harked back to the experience of the 1970s, as 
sceptics sought to right the wrongs of that vote and pro-Europeans looked to emulate aspects 
they believed had worked well (Smith, forthcoming). In addition, the Political Parties, 
Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA) provided a more heavily regulated template 
for any UK-wide referendum than had been envisaged in the 1970s.   
 
The PPERA 2000 legislation sets out the rules for referendums, including the role of the 
Electoral Commission in advising on the question, financial matters such as spending limits 
and permitted participants (those who have a right to register and to donate money) and rules 
on ‘purdah’, a period during which the government and other public bodies may not 
campaign. Debate during the passage of the legislation thus centred on the referendum 
question itself, rules on purdah, financial rules and the nature of the franchise and would in 
turn shape the terms of the subsequent referendum debate proper (Smith, forthcoming). 
 
The question and the franchise 
The language of the 1975 referendum question - ‘Do you think that the United Kingdom 
should stay in the European Community (the Common Market)?’ (Butler and Kitzinger 1996: 
1; emphasis added) - was clear and straightforward but arguably skewed towards the status 
quo. The anti-marketeers were unhappy with the question that had been asked in 1975, 
preferring something like ‘Should the UK be a member…?’ (Smith 1999: 53-4). The 
Government initially proposed a similarly small-c conservative question in 2015: ‘Should the 
United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union?’ However, it accepted the 
recommendation of the Electoral Commission to use the more clumsy formulation of ‘Should 
the UK remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?’ The answers 
then being ‘Remain a member of the European Union’ and ‘Leave the European Union’.16 
The Electoral Commission deemed this wording to be the most balanced on the basis of its 
research; questions such as ‘Should the UK be a member of the European Union?’ which 
might on first reading appear more neutral were rejected on the grounds that some 
respondents were not aware that the UK was a member of the EU (Electoral Commission 
2015). While there were moves to enfranchise 16 and 17 year-olds as happened in the 
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Scottish independence referendum as well as EU nationals resident in the UK and UK 
nationals who had been living elsewhere in the EU for fifteen years or more, the legislation 
finally adopted was based on the Westminster franchise, with only two minor additions - 
peers of the realm and residents of Gibraltar who would be entitled to vote in elections to the 
European Parliament (EU Referendum Act 2015, section 2). Thus UK and Commonwealth 
citizens aged 18 and over would have the right to vote under this legislation but EU nationals 
living and working in the UK thanks to acquired free movement rights do not (unless they 
happen to be Irish for whom special rules apply or from the other two EU/Commonwealth 
states: Cyprus or Malta). Technically similar to the franchise used in 1975, the ramifications 
in 2016 were rather different since the 1993 Maastricht Treaty had enshrined certain 
citizenship rights which meant that some UK nationals resident abroad and EU nationals 
resident in the UK on the basis of their treaty rights would not be permitted to vote even 
though they would be particularly affected by a vote to leave the EU. 
 
The Political Actors 
In the 1970s the Foreign and Commonwealth Office identified six broad groups of pro- and 
anti-Marketeers.
17
 Those who wished to remain fell into three categories – i) federalists such 
as Edward Heath and Roy Jenkins; ii) surrogate imperialists such as Duncan Sandys who had 
given up on the US as an ally and turned to Europe; and iii) those who believed there was no 
alternative to membership (TINAs), mostly pragmatists such as Harold Wilson and James 
Callaghan. Those who sought to leave the Community also fell into three broad groups: iv) 
nationalists of left and right, including left-wing economists who believed in ’Socialism in 
one country’ such as Lord (Nicky) Kaldor and Lord (Tommy) Balogh, and little Englanders 
best exemplified by Enoch Powell; Scottish and Welsh nationalists were officially also 
opposed to membership, although as with other parties, some members broke ranks on an 
issue that divided parties of government and opposition then as now; v) Liberal 
Internationalists – not normally Liberals but rather left-leaning Labour politicians such as 
Judith Hart and Peter Shore who rejected the European Community as a rich man’s club, 
while free-market economic liberals also objected to the regulation they believed the EC 
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brought; finally, vi) Atlanticists such as right-wing Labour MP Bruce George favoured Nato 
and links with the US over European entanglement.  
 
While the rhetoric may have changed in the intervening forty years, many of the positions 
espoused in the 1960s and 1970s, before and immediately after accession - and the type of 
person advocating them - appear to fit into that Foreign Office matrix, even if the global 
context had changed markedly. There were still European federalists, although they typically 
kept their views even quieter than did Jenkins and Heath, recognising that the language of 
federalism would antagonise The Daily Mail and other newspapers, which having been 
largely pro-European in 1975 (Seymour-Ure 1996) had nearly all become Eurosceptic thanks 
largely to changes of ownership.
18
 And while few would admit to imperialism, surrogate or 
otherwise, TINA perhaps best characterised the bulk of those who wished to remain in the 
EU in the 21
st
 century, including, notably, leading figures in the Conservative Party. While all 
would describe themselves as ‘Eurosceptic’, a term not yet coined in 1975, the Prime 
Minister, Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne and both of Cameron’s Foreign 
Secretaries, William Hague (2010-14) and Philip Hammond (2014- ) believed that 
membership was in the best interests of the UK, even if they lacked genuine enthusiasm for 
the Union. Certainly they lacked the cultural affinity that characterised former deputy Prime 
Minister Nick Clegg’s pro-Europeanism, which was a rare commodity in British politics. Yet 
Clegg himself was a pragmatic European – indeed, he had made the case for the EU needing 
‘reform’ while still an MEP (Clegg 2000). Nor did Labour’s position differ markedly – pro-
European federalists like Jenkins having been replaced by Euro-realists such as sometime 
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and former Prime Minister Tony Blair. 
 
Others made the case for withdrawal from the ranks of the Conservative Party – albeit from 
the backbenches prior to the completion of the renegotiation. These would include 
Atlanticists, such as former Defence Secretary Liam Fox, who vigorously pressed the 
argument that NATO not the EU had kept the peace in Europe. The Left also had its (rather 
smaller) share of leavers in 2015/16 with Kate Hoey’s references to the developing world at 
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the launch of Grassroots Out (GO!) on 23
rd
 January 2016 reminiscent of Hart’s liberal 
internationalist stance.   
 
The nationalists had diverged by 2015/6. The Scottish and Welsh nationalists had changed 
their official positions completely in the intervening forty years. The SNP now believed that 
membership of the European Union was beneficial for Scotland, its identity and legal system 
being closer to those of mainland Europe than to England and offering the prospect of 
enabling it to be an independent state with a seat at the EU table along the lines enjoyed by 
Ireland and Denmark.
19
 Similarly, the Welsh nationalist party Plaid Cymru advocated 
ongoing membership of the EU. Meanwhile, in Northern Ireland many in the far-left 
nationalist Sinn Fein were keen for the UK to remain in the EU to ensure Ireland was not 
separated by a hard EU external border. English nationalists, often supporting UKIP, 
meanwhile, still tended to favour leaving the EU.  
 
The battle lines are drawn 
In 1975 the anti-Marketeers mostly came together under the National Referendum Campaign 
umbrella organisation with pro-Marketeers campaigning under the label ‘Britain in Europe’.  
Those in favour of remaining in the Community were better organised and better funded than 
their opponents, and could count on the bulk of the political, media and business 
establishments. While each umbrella organisation received £125,000 from the government by 
way of an advertising grant, Britain in Europe was able to secure significantly more funding 
than the NRC: £1,825,000 to £8,160 (Butler and Kitzinger 1996: 86 and 110). It was also 
better able to mobilise support thanks to its strong cross-party base, which assembled leading 
politicians from the three main parties, whereas the antis were perceived to be a set of 
mavericks from the political extremes (to the extent the UK had any ‘extreme’ politics) not 
least as they included the National Front and Enoch Powell. With hindsight, it appeared that 
the cards were very much stacked in favour of remaining in the Community in 1975, a 
position compounded by the extent of positive media coverage, especially in the print media, 
and the extensive business backing for Britain in Europe. 
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The situation in 2016 looked rather different as the two sides prepared to do referendum 
battle again. The Electoral Commission was required under the EU Referendum Act 2016 to 
decide which two umbrella organisations (one for Remain and one for Leave) should be the 
‘designated organisations’ which under the terms of the Act would receive state funding and 
certain broadcasting and other rights. A regulated period of ten weeks was established and the 
government agreed there should be sixteen weeks between setting the date of the referendum 
and its being held to allow time for the Electoral Commission to determine the respective 
designated organisations (Penrose 2015).  
 
The antis had got going much earlier, not least as for them there was no point in waiting for 
Cameron to conclude his negotiations before they began campaigning; most were clear he 
could never secure sufficient concessions to render membership acceptable. Regaining the 
UK’s seat in the WTO (a UKIP demand), significant repatriation of powers and enhanced 
(parliamentary) sovereignty were not on Cameron’s wish list to Tusk and the 27, calls for a 
‘red card’ for national parliaments notwithstanding. Moreover, those who opposed the 
European Community had continued to make their views about the EC/U known throughout 
the intervening forty years, while pro-Europeans, having incorrectly assumed in 1975 that the 
question had been decided in perpetuity, neglected to make the on-going case for 
membership. This would not have mattered if the public had become reconciled to 
membership, as was the case in other member states. However, repeated treaty reforms, 
especially the Maastricht Treaty, had made the British public even more reluctant Europeans. 
Europe was still not a particularly salient issue for the general public, but the mood was quite 
negative, which assisted those most vigorously opposed to the EU for whom the EU and the 
associated issues of free movement and migration were of high salience. Momentum for 
leaving the EU thus gathered pace while support for staying in had been muted for decades, 
cloaked as it was in complacency.  
  
The advantage of getting out a consistent Eurosceptic message was to some extent offset by 
the fragmentation of those favouring ‘leave’. Within the Conservative Party alone a range of 
Eurosceptic groups had emerged over the years, starting with the Bruges Group dating back 
to Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech of 1988. The Better Off Out group, as the name 
implied, favoured withdrawal, while the Fresh Start group took a more moderate position and 
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the Conservatives for Britain officially asserted that they were waiting to see what David 
Cameron’s renegotiation yielded. However, their demands for repatriating powers went far 
beyond the issues that the Prime Minister envisaged putting to his EU partners or could 
conceivably be agreed by the other member states. Hence Lord Lawson’s autumn 2015 
announcement that he had concluded that the PM would not be able to achieve sufficient 
reforms and that he would support the leave campaign, as did many of the Fresh Start Group 
when the starting gun for the referendum was finally triggered. Labour also had a small 
faction of MPs in favour of leaving the EU, most notably Gisela Stuart, Kate Hoey and Frank 
Field. The leader of UKIP, Nigel Farage, joined forces with Hoey and new Tory MP Tom 
Pursglove to write a joint letter to The Daily Telegraph in January 2016 arguing that the 
European issue was above party (Farage et al 2016). This point was reiterated in January 
2016 when a new cross-party initiative – Grassroots Out or GO! – was launched.  
Conservative, UKIP, Labour and Democratic Unionist MPs and MEPs signed what they 
grandly called the ‘Kettering Declaration’, stating:  
 
‘We, the undersigned, declare that in the weeks and months ahead we shall set aside 
party politics and work together towards our common goal of a free and prosperous 
United Kingdom outside the European Union, engaged with the wider world and 
governed by its own laws.’ 
 
Yet if Farage was able to work with leavers from other parties, he found it more difficult to 
work with his sole MP, Douglas Carswell, as the two found themselves supporting rival 
umbrella Leave campaigns. Farage indicated his support for Leave.eu funded by businessman 
Aaron Banks, while Carswell put his name to Vote Leave headed by Matthew Elliot, who had 
been a leading figure in the successful ‘No to AV’ campaign in 2011. The similarity of the 
names and aims of the two groups ‘led to critics in Westminster compare [sic] them to the 
“Judean People’s Front” and the “People’s Front of Judea” from Monty Python film “Life of 
Brian” (Hope 2015). While the initial expectation was that the two groups, and with them the 
UKIP MP and his leader, would ultimately merge into a single Leave campaign, their 
sparring in 2015/16 gave some respite to those who favoured remaining and who were 
struggling to gain traction (ibid). The provisions of PPERA and the EU Referendum Act 
2015 provide for the Electoral Commission to resolve the matter should the various leave 
20 
 
factions be unable to come to an agreement themselves.  However while the Vote Leave 
campaign did secure the umbrella Leave designation from the Electoral Commission in April 
2016, Leave.EU/GO! Continued their activities alongside the designated organisation.
20
 
 
While slower off the mark, the remain side was not entirely silent. With the prospect of a 
referendum a range of pro-EU groupings began to emerge, including the proto-type umbrella 
remain organisation, Stronger Britain in Europe (BSE) headed by Lord (Stuart) Rose, former 
head of Marks and Spencer, alongside more geographically or sectorally specific groups such 
as Cambridge for Europe and Scientists for EU.
21
 Universities UK (the umbrella organisation 
for British Universities) launched their own campaign to remain in the Union in the summer 
of 2015, much to the chagrin of UKIP, which claimed there was foul play in a body seeking 
to stay in the EU stating its case so early despite the fact that Eurosceptic groups such as 
Business for Britain had been running for years.
22
 Labour and the Liberal Democrats both 
launched their individual party pro-EU campaign groups before the Government’s 
renegotiation was complete, respectively ‘Labour In for Britain’ led by former Home 
Secretary Alan Johnson, and ‘IN Together’ fronted by the Lib Dems’ sole surviving MEP 
following its routing in 2014, Catherine Bearder. Pro-remain Conservatives came together as 
Conservatives In with David Cameron as Patron on 24
th
 February, just days after the 
renegotiation was completed. 
 
Cabinet Responsibility 
Harold Wilson had ‘a political imperative - to hold his party together’ (Donoughue 1993: 
199). He initially refused to waive collective Cabinet responsibility, eventually agreeing to 
waive it but only after Cabinet had taken its decision, which was two to one in favour of 
staying in on the new terms. This rapidly became a de facto agreement to waive collective 
responsibility throughout the government, although Wilson did not permit ministers to make 
hostile speeches in Parliament (Donoughue 1993: 201). Wilson did not personally have 
strong views on membership; he did advocate remaining once he had secured his 
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renegotiation but did not stake his premiership on it. His Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, 
played a crucial and positive role in the renegotiations and making the case for the UK to stay 
in.  
 
David Cameron’s approach was very much predicated on his own ability to secure reform 
and altered terms of membership, though he too relied on a key Cabinet member and possible 
leadership successor, George Osborne for support. Cameron demanded that his MPs and 
MEPs hold the party line of ‘reform, renegotiation and referendum’ until the negotiations 
were complete. Breaking ranks before the renegotiation was complete was thus taken to 
imply that his colleagues had no faith in his negotiations, although some peers and backbench 
MPs did so. Pro-EU MPs urged the PM to maintain Cabinet responsibility once the 
negotiations were complete since a rejection of the terms on offer would also represent lack 
of confidence in the PM (Field 2015). The Prime Minister however gave in to demands for 
collective responsibility to be waived, announcing his change of heart on 5
th
 January 2016 
even before the negotiations had been completed (Cameron 2016). The position was a rather 
awkward one, very much like Wilson’s, whereby the Government would adopt a position 
formally but ministers would not be bound by it. In theory, collective responsibility was to be 
waived only after the negotiations were over but in practice many MPs showed their hands 
virtually as soon as Cameron made his announcement. And while each Prime Minister saw 
half a dozen Cabinet ministers take an opposing stance, Cameron was faced with an 
unexpected opponent in London Mayor and a challenger to replace him as leader, Boris 
Johnson, who announced he would be voting to leave. This was a significant early setback for 
Cameron. That part of Cameron’s hand was played less well than Wilson’s.   
 
Eternal and emerging issues  
Many of the themes rehearsed in the years prior to accession and replayed in 1975 could be 
heard again as the UK prepared for its second vote on the subject (Wallace 1975, cited in 
Smith 1999: 44). Money in the guise of UK contributions to Community budget, jobs and 
sovereignty as well as the Commonwealth were debated at length in 1975, although many 
Eurosceptics would later claim that they believed they were joining a common market and 
22 
 
knew nothing of the political ambitions associated with European integration.
23
 All these 
themes would be on the agenda forty years later, although New Zealand butter and lamb no 
longer featured, reflecting both changed attitudes towards the Commonwealth and, more 
importantly perhaps, greatly altered trade patterns as a result of over four decades of EU 
membership. 
 
Free movement of people/immigration, a key driver in the renegotiation, albeit with little to 
show in the actual deal, was set to be a new issue on the agenda for the second referendum 
thanks to the large numbers of EU nationals from central and eastern Europe who had been 
exercising their rights of free movement since accession in 2004. The associated welfare 
benefits issues as well as the sheer weight of numbers of EU nationals living and working in 
the UK – or rather in England, the most densely populated part of the UK 24- had knock-on 
effects for public attitudes towards the EU. First picked up by UKIP, most noticeably via a 
poster-campaign during the 2010 general election in which they focused on immigration, by 
2016 the issue was among the top three salient issues for voters alongside the economy and 
the NHS (Clarke et al 2016: 154).  
 
Coming in the wake of a protracted refugee crisis that started in spring 2015, concerns that 
immigration, already a key campaign issue for many Eurosceptics, would dominate debate in 
the referendum affected the Prime Minister’s calculations on timing the referendum.  
Whereas Wilson could call the referendum at a time of his own choosing in 1975, by early 
2016, David Cameron found himself boxed into a corner in part of his own making, in part 
due to international factors outside his control. Having set 31
st
 December 2017 as the very 
final date for the referendum Cameron and his team then had to work backwards to find a 
suitable date, given that the UK was due to hold the rotating Council Presidency in the 
second half of 2017, a year in which both France and Germany were due to hold national 
elections. Summer 2016 thus became the preferred time for the referendum, with June the 
date favoured by No 10 in the hope that the referendum would occur before any more 
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significant refugee issues – and before yet another Conservative conference could be 
overshadowed by the European question. Thus, completing the negotiations in February 
allowed Cameron to go for his preferred date of 23
rd
 June. 
One major difference between the two referendums would be the importance of what leaving 
the European Union would mean in practice. In 1975 it was relatively clear that a vote to 
withdraw would mean a return to the status quo ante. Leaving in 1975 would have required 
some negotiations and had an impact on the UK but nothing like the effect of attempting to 
disentangle the UK after more than forty years of integration during which both widening and 
deepening of the Union had had their effect on all Member States, and when the UK had 
incorporated the ever-expanding acquis communautaire into domestic law. And the world 
outside the Union had changed profoundly too - the Commonwealth and the United States 
had changed and the UK was far less central to their concerns, as the US pivoted to Asia and 
the old Commonwealth ties had less traction, despite the rhetoric of the sceptics. There was 
no clear blueprint of what life outside the EU might entail for a country that had just left. Nor, 
as the Leavers were quick to point out, would ‘remain’ necessarily imply the status quo given 
both the renegotiation undertaken by Cameron, which was explicitly intended to alter the 
relationship between the UK and the other member states but would not come into effect until 
after a successful vote to remain, and the fact that the EU is an ever-changing project. Hence 
sceptics argue that remaining does not entail the status quo as the EU needs to evolve and 
reform itself in light of the on-going Eurozone problems.  
 
Thus there was a real chance that the debate could descend into hypotheticals, allowing either 
doomsday scenarios or unrealistically positive pictures of life outside the EU to be cast by the 
two sides. The Government initially argued that it should be for those who wished to leave to 
explain to voters what leave would mean, but it eventually accepted the logic of arguments 
put forward by various members of the House of Lords, the current author included, and 
agreed to produce a factual report on what alternatives to EU membership currently exist, 
which could be used to inform voters (EU Referendum Act 2015, para 7). There is also a 
question of what can be achieved in Article 50 negotiations should the UK vote to leave. 
Article 50, the provision in the Lisbon Treaty intended to provide a way for states to leave the 
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EU, is so far untried and untested, so the precise workings are subject to speculation rather 
than prior experience.
25
 
 
Some, including Boris Johnson and former Tory leader Michael Howard, asserted that a vote 
to leave could trigger a second referendum, allowing the UK to secure a better deal. 
However, the oft-drawn analogy with the cases of Denmark and Ireland being asked to vote 
again after rejecting various treaties in referendums was not obviously valid. In those cases, 
the other member states required their affirmation in order to ratify the treaties, which must 
be done by unanimity. By contrast, a UK vote to leave would be something which the UK 
had chosen and while the other member states are not actively seeking Brexit, there is a view 
that the UK should not be treated more favourably by threatening to leave.
26
 Moreover, it is 
hard to see how a Prime Minister could turn to his European colleagues and say words to the 
effect of: ‘We’d like to renegotiate – again – because I think that the British voters don’t 
really want to leave, they just want a better deal.’ Such an approach would almost certainly 
be rejected at the EU level given the tensions regarding the UK’s awkwardness even before a 
vote to leave, but, crucially, also suggests a fundamental disrespect for the views of the 
British electorate.  
 
There are several possible alternatives to membership for a state that wishes to be outside the 
EU but with access to the single market, although it is unclear that any would offer the UK 
what some leavers appeared to want: unfettered access to a common market without political 
or legal integration. Jean-Claude Piris (2016) argues there are seven different alternatives to 
membership, including the two most commonly referred to in debates, vis: 1) the 
‘Norwegian’ model, more formally meaning membership of the European Economic Area, 
which is characterised by ‘fax democracy’ whereby the Norwegians are required to sign up to 
the bulk of the EU’s acquis communautaire and to contribute to the EU’s budget but have no 
seat at the table when the rules are decided (see Fossum 2015);
27
 2) the EFTA or Swiss 
model, which gives Switzerland more latitude than that enjoyed by Norway but it depends on 
hundreds of bilateral agreements. Moreover, Switzerland is also subject to the EU rules as it 
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found to its cost when the EU response to a domestic referendum on immigration was to 
suspend Switzerland’s access to EU Research funding. Piris concluded that no alternative 
would give the UK the sort of unfettered access to the internal market that it seeks without 
having to abide by certain conditions, which could plausibly be as onerous as membership 
but without the leverage accorded to members. Thus: ‘An overarching theme is that, if the 
UK wants access to the single market when it has left the EU, it will have to accept …: 
continued free movement of labour, and the continued supremacy of EU law over British law 
in the single market’ (Piris 2016, p. 1). So unpalatable did these options sound that the 
official Vote Leave camp began to argue that access to the single market was not necessary. 
 
Conclusions 
As this in-depth comparative article has demonstrated, there are many parallels between the 
decisions of Harold Wilson and David Cameron to renegotiate the UK’s relationship with her 
European partners and to grant citizens the right to decide on the future relationship rather 
than persist in the dogma of parliamentary sovereignty that had been invoked when Edward 
Heath took the UK in the European Community in 1973. This is most clearly seen in the 
attempt of a prime minister leading a divided party trying to resolve an issue causing deep 
divisions within his own party by means of renegotiating membership of the EU and allowing 
the people rather than parliament to decide. Many of the issues remained the same but the 
stakes would be much higher in 2016 than in 1975, the costs and uncertainties of leaving far 
greater given the changing European and global contexts.   
 
Yet by 2016 it was clear that a referendum would not necessarily end the enduring debate 
over the UK’s relationship with the European Union, nor yet hold divided parties together. 
No longer a constitutional innovation, the referendum had become the device of choice for 
leaders unable to tackle constitutionally divisive issues through parliamentary means. While 
the mantra of letting the people decide appears to enhance democracy, in practice it has 
become a form of party management. As in 1975, however, Cameron’s referendum was 
unlikely to end questions over the UK’s membership of the EU, especially if the decision 
were to remain (Glencross 2015). Whereas Jenkins and Wilson assumed that the 1975 result 
was definitive, the intervening forty years proved them wrong as the anti-Marketeers kept on 
campaigning, gradually acquiring a much broader base of support thanks to repeated treaty 
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reform and decades of broken promises to allow citizens to have say on the UK’s relationship 
with the EU coupled with growing media hostility to the EU and the reluctance of business to 
speak out. The very fact that leading politicians were calling for a referendum because no-one 
under the age of 59 had been able to vote on whether or not the UK should be a member 
already paves the way for further calls in the future.   
 
Tellingly, the idea that the Scottish independence referendum had ended that question ‘for a 
generation’ was quickly disproved as nationalists rapidly talked of a vote for Brexit providing 
the conditions under which a second independence referendum could be triggered. A leave 
vote could precipitate ‘Sexit’ – Scottish departure from the United Kingdom. It would also 
have profound implications for the Republic of Ireland, for Northern Ireland and for Anglo-
Irish relations. Moreover, the EU Act 2011 ensures that a future vote would be triggered if, or 
rather whenever, there is a treaty reform that would shift powers to the EU, a prospect 
envisaged in the new British settlement. The chances that such a vote would become a proxy 
for another in/out vote would surely be high.  
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